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Texas has been voting Republican in presidential elections since 1980, but the 2022 and 2024 election cycles revealed something new: a realignment running through the state’s youngest voters and its historically Democratic Hispanic-majority regions. This post is a strictly data-driven analysis of what actually happened, what the numbers actually show, and what it means for the next generation of Texas conservative politics.

Every number, named individual, and election result in this post is sourced to Wikipedia’s documentation of the 2024 United States presidential election in Texas, the Wikipedia articles on Mayra Flores and Monica De La Cruz, and public election records. Where reliable Gen Z-specific exit polling data is not available from Wikipedia or primary sources, this post explicitly notes the data gap rather than making unsourced claims.

The Short Version

  • Donald Trump won Texas in 2024 by 13.7 percentage points (56.14% to 42.46%), becoming “the first presidential candidate to receive over 6 million votes in Texas” per Wikipedia
  • Kamala Harris won only 12 Texas counties: “the least for any Democrat in the state since George McGovern in 1972”
  • Maverick County (95% Hispanic) shifted 28 points right: Trump’s largest county gain in the entire country
  • Starr County (97.7% Hispanic) voted Republican for the first time since 1892
  • 55% of Texas Latinos voted for Trump in 2024, per exit polling referenced on Wikipedia, the first time a Republican candidate won a majority of both Asian and Latino voters in Texas
  • Mayra Flores became the first Mexican-born woman in Congress when she won a June 2022 Texas special election
  • Monica De La Cruz became the first Republican ever to represent Texas’s 15th Congressional District, created in 1903

The 2024 Numbers: What Actually Happened

The most recent Texas presidential election, 2024: produced the most lopsided Republican margin in the state in decades. Per Wikipedia’s documentation of the 2024 United States presidential election in Texas:

Candidate Votes Percentage
Donald Trump (Republican) 6,393,597 56.14%
Kamala Harris (Democrat) 4,835,250 42.46%
Margin +1,558,347 +13.7 points

Wikipedia documents that Trump’s 2024 Texas performance set multiple records: he became “the first presidential candidate to receive over 6 million votes in Texas” and achieved “the largest vote total ever received by a Republican presidential candidate in any state.”

Kamala Harris won only 12 Texas counties in 2024, “the least for any Democrat in the state since George McGovern in 1972,” per Wikipedia. To put that in historical context, that’s the worst county-level showing for a Democratic presidential candidate in Texas in more than half a century.

Trump “carried all but two Texas counties located on the Mexico–United States border,” per Wikipedia. The only border counties Harris won were El Paso County and Presidio County. Every other border county, historically the most reliably Democratic region in Texas, went Republican.

The Rio Grande Valley Realignment

The story of the 2024 Texas election is not just about Trump’s overall margin, it’s about where the shift happened. The Rio Grande Valley (RGV), the string of Hispanic-majority counties along the Texas-Mexico border that had voted Democratic for generations, realigned dramatically Republican in the 2020-2024 period. Two specific county shifts documented on Wikipedia stand out:

Maverick County (county seat: Eagle Pass). 95% Hispanic by population. In 2024, Maverick County shifted 28 percentage points rightward from its 2020 result, Trump’s “largest county gain in the country,” per Wikipedia. This is not a typical year-over-year swing. A 28-point shift in a single election cycle is the kind of political earthquake that reshapes a region’s institutional politics for a generation.

Starr County (county seat: Rio Grande City). 97.7% Hispanic. In 2024, Starr County voted Republican in a presidential election for the first time since 1892: a 132-year streak broken. Wikipedia’s framing of this fact (“the first time a Republican won the county since 1892”) is worth reading twice. Starr County had gone Democratic in every presidential election from 1896 through 2020, including elections during which Republicans were winning Texas by double digits statewide. In 2024, that streak ended.

These are the two most dramatic examples, but the broader pattern held across the Rio Grande Valley: every border county except El Paso and Presidio voted Republican. Cameron County (Brownsville area), Hidalgo County (McAllen area), Webb County (Laredo area), Zavala, Dimmit, and Val Verde Counties all moved right.

The Hispanic Vote Story

The Rio Grande Valley realignment is one expression of a broader shift: the Hispanic vote in Texas moved substantially toward the Republican Party in the 2020-2024 period, culminating in Trump winning a majority of Texas Latinos in 2024.

Per Wikipedia’s documentation of exit polling for the 2024 Texas presidential election: 55% of Texas Latinos voted for Trump. The Wikipedia article describes this as “the first time a Republican candidate won a majority of both Asian and Latino voters in Texas.” A majority of Texas’s two largest non-white demographic groups, combining roughly 40%+ of the state’s total population, voted Republican in 2024.

This is a structural shift, not a one-cycle anomaly. Exit polling trends documented for the 2020 and 2022 cycles showed Hispanic voters moving steadily Republican in Texas, and 2024 was the cycle in which the shift crossed the majority threshold. The reasons for the shift are the subject of ongoing political analysis and are beyond the scope of a strictly factual post, but the data is clear: Texas’s Hispanic voters, as a bloc, voted Republican at majority levels for the first time in the state’s modern electoral history.

The Flores-De La Cruz Breakthroughs

The Hispanic conservative realignment produced two specific individual victories that deserve their own section, because they broke institutional barriers that had stood for more than a century each.

Mayra Flores: First Mexican-Born Woman in Congress

Mayra Flores won a special election for Texas’s 34th Congressional District on June 14, 2022, and was sworn in on June 21, 2022. Per Wikipedia, Flores “is the first Mexican-born woman elected to serve in Congress” and was also “the first female Mexican-born member of the House.”

Flores was born January 1, 1986, in Burgos, Tamaulipas, Mexico, to migrant farmworker parents. Her family moved to the United States when she was six years old, and she gained U.S. citizenship at age 14. Before her political career, she worked as a respiratory therapist. Wikipedia documents that Flores “ran her campaign appealing to Hispanic and Latino Americans and their disillusionment with the Democratic Party,” particularly in South Texas, historically a Democratic stronghold.

Flores lost her 2022 general election re-match to Democrat Vicente Gonzalez (53% to 44%) and lost again in 2024 by 5,137 votes (51.3% to 48.7%) in the newly redrawn district. Despite those losses, her June 2022 special election victory marked a symbolic turning point: a Mexican-born Hispanic Republican woman winning a Texas congressional seat in the Rio Grande Valley.

Monica De La Cruz: First Republican Ever in TX-15

Monica De La Cruz was elected in 2022 and took office on January 3, 2023, representing Texas’s 15th Congressional District. Per Wikipedia, “When she took office in 2023, she became only the eighth person to represent this district since its creation in 1903, and the first Republican.”

Let that sink in. Texas’s 15th Congressional District has existed since 1903, 120 years, and had never been represented by a Republican until Monica De La Cruz in 2023. Wikipedia also notes that De La Cruz “was the second Republican elected from a Río Grande Valley county in over a century; the first, Mayra Flores, was elected to a partial term in a neighboring district in 2022.”

De La Cruz was born in Brownsville, Texas, graduated from James Pace Early College High School, and earned a BBA from the University of Texas at San Antonio. She worked in media and as an insurance agent and business owner before running for Congress. She is currently serving her second term.

Together, Flores and De La Cruz represent the institutional breakthroughs that the 2022-2024 Hispanic conservative realignment produced in Texas. Their victories, along with the county-level shifts in Maverick, Starr, and the rest of the RGV, are the most tangible evidence of the realignment.

Gen Z Specifically: What the Data Does and Does Not Show

A note on methodology: this section is about what reliable data shows regarding Gen Z voters specifically in Texas, and where that data has gaps. Wikipedia’s documentation of the 2024 Texas presidential election does not break out Gen Z or age-specific exit polling in the level of detail that would allow precise generational analysis. Other polling aggregators and academic sources exist, but this post is limited to what Wikipedia and primary election records document directly.

What the data does show:

  • Trump’s overall Texas margin grew from roughly 5.6 points in 2020 to 13.7 points in 2024: a substantial expansion of Republican support in a state whose demographic profile (younger, more Hispanic than the national average) would normally predict the opposite trajectory if Gen Z and Hispanic voters were moving leftward
  • The specific counties that flipped: Maverick, Starr, and the broader RGV, have some of the youngest demographic profiles in Texas, with significantly higher proportions of voters under 30 than the state average
  • Hispanic voters overall reached 55% Republican support per 2024 exit polling, and Hispanic voters in Texas skew younger than the state average

What the data does not directly show (from the sources this post is limited to):

  • Specific Gen Z voter percentages broken out by age in Texas for 2020, 2022, or 2024
  • Precinct-level Gen Z data that would allow direct comparison of youth vote shifts
  • University-level polling on Texas college student political preferences

For readers interested in rigorous Gen Z-specific polling data on Texas voters, academic institutions such as the Texas Politics Project at the University of Texas at Austin and national organizations such as Pew Research Center publish periodic analyses. This post does not quote specific percentages from those sources, because the post is limited to Wikipedia and primary election records for verifiable claims.

The honest summary: the county-level, Hispanic, and RGV data that is reliably documented is consistent with a broader Gen Z rightward shift in Texas, but Wikipedia does not document age-specific exit polling with the granularity needed to make a precise numerical claim about Gen Z voters alone. Interpret the overall data accordingly.

The Young Republican Infrastructure in Texas

The rightward shift among young Texas voters, to the extent it is documented, has run in parallel with significant growth in the organized Young Republican infrastructure in Texas. Young Republicans of Texas (YRT), the official youth auxiliary of the Republican Party of Texas recognized by the State Republican Executive Committee in September 2023, now operates 21 chartered chapters (as of 2026) across every major Texas metro and dozens of suburban and rural counties, with more than 2,200 members across the federation.

YRT sits inside a broader young-conservative ecosystem that includes:

  • Turning Point USA (TPUSA), founded in 2012 by Charlie Kirk, which operates high school and college chapters across Texas
  • College Republicans of Texas, the state federation of College Republican chapters at Texas universities
  • Young Conservatives of Texas (YCT), a non-partisan conservative youth organization with a long history at Texas universities, see YRT vs. YCT for the distinction
  • The Young Republican National Federation (YRNF), the national youth auxiliary dating to 1931, see What Is a Young Republican? for the history

The combined effect of this infrastructure is that young Texans who lean conservative have more organized outlets to plug into than at any point in Texas political history. Whether that infrastructure is a cause of the rightward shift, a consequence of it, or both, is a matter for political scientists to sort out. What is clear is that the infrastructure exists, is growing, and is producing identifiable institutional outcomes, specific Republican victories, specific county-level shifts, specific chapter growth.

What It Means for the Republican Party of Texas

For the Republican Party of Texas, the 2020-2024 cycles documented a coalition expansion that was not guaranteed by the state’s demographic trajectory. The conventional political wisdom of the 2010s held that Texas was likely to become a competitive swing state in presidential elections as its Hispanic population grew and its urban metros expanded. Based on Wikipedia’s documentation of actual election results, the opposite has happened: Texas has moved more solidly Republican at the presidential level even as the Hispanic population has grown, driven by the Hispanic conservative realignment and the collapse of Democratic margins in the Rio Grande Valley.

The implications for Republican organizational strategy in Texas are significant:

  1. The Hispanic vote is now part of the Texas Republican coalition, not a distant target. Republican candidates in Texas can compete meaningfully for Hispanic voters at majority-plus levels.
  2. The Rio Grande Valley is no longer safely Democratic. Counties that voted Democratic continuously for 100+ years are now competitive or Republican-leaning.
  3. Young voter infrastructure matters. Whatever the specific contribution of Gen Z voters to the overall shift, the existence of robust Young Republican organizations, YRT, TPUSA Texas, College Republicans, is a long-term investment that outlasts any single election cycle.

For young Texans evaluating their political options in 2026, the data is consistent with one practical conclusion: the Republican Party of Texas has coalitions and infrastructure that are growing, not shrinking, and the organized path into party activism for conservatives ages 18 to 40 runs through YRT’s 21 chartered chapters.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was Trump’s margin in Texas in 2024?

Trump won Texas in 2024 with 56.14% of the vote compared to Harris’s 42.46%, a 13.7 percentage point margin, representing over 1.5 million more votes. Per Wikipedia, Trump became “the first presidential candidate to receive over 6 million votes in Texas” (6,393,597 total) and achieved “the largest vote total ever received by a Republican presidential candidate in any state.”

How many Texas counties did Kamala Harris win in 2024?

Kamala Harris won only 12 Texas counties in 2024, “the least for any Democrat in the state since George McGovern in 1972,” per Wikipedia. Harris lost every Texas border county except El Paso and Presidio.

Which Texas counties shifted most dramatically Republican in 2024?

Maverick County (95% Hispanic, Eagle Pass area) shifted 28 percentage points rightward in 2024, Trump’s largest county gain in the entire country, per Wikipedia. Starr County (97.7% Hispanic, Rio Grande City area) voted Republican in a presidential election for the first time since 1892: a 132-year streak broken. The broader Rio Grande Valley realignment saw every RGV border county except El Paso and Presidio vote Republican.

What percentage of Texas Latinos voted for Trump in 2024?

Per Wikipedia’s documentation of 2024 exit polling, 55% of Texas Latinos voted for Trump. This represented “the first time a Republican candidate won a majority of both Asian and Latino voters in Texas.”

Who was the first Mexican-born woman elected to Congress from Texas?

Mayra Flores won a special election for Texas’s 34th Congressional District on June 14, 2022, becoming the first Mexican-born woman elected to serve in Congress, per Wikipedia. Flores was born in Burgos, Tamaulipas, Mexico, in 1986 and gained U.S. citizenship at age 14. She lost the November 2022 general election and her subsequent 2024 rematch.

Who was the first Republican ever to represent Texas’s 15th Congressional District?

Monica De La Cruz became the first Republican to represent Texas’s 15th Congressional District when she took office in January 2023, per Wikipedia. Texas’s 15th Congressional District was created in 1903, and De La Cruz’s 2023 election was the first Republican victory in the district in its 120-year history. She was born in Brownsville, Texas, and earned a BBA from the University of Texas at San Antonio.

Does this mean Gen Z voters in Texas are moving Republican?

The data Wikipedia documents, county-level 2024 results, Hispanic exit polling, and the RGV realignment, is consistent with a broader Gen Z rightward shift in Texas, but Wikipedia does not document age-specific exit polling with the precision needed for a direct numerical claim about Gen Z voters alone. For rigorous youth-specific polling, readers should consult academic sources such as the Texas Politics Project at the University of Texas at Austin. The overall Texas political trajectory, Trump’s 13.7-point win, 55% Hispanic support, 12 counties for Harris, is consistent with broad Republican expansion across demographic groups including young voters.

How does Young Republicans of Texas (YRT) fit into this trend?

Young Republicans of Texas (YRT) is the official youth auxiliary of the Republican Party of Texas, recognized by the State Republican Executive Committee in September 2023. YRT currently operates 21 chartered chapters across Texas (as of 2026) with more than 2,200 members serving conservative Texans ages 18-40. Whether YRT’s growth is a cause of the broader rightward shift among young Texans, a consequence of it, or both, is an open question for political researchers. What is verifiable is that YRT now operates the most organized institutional pipeline for young Texas conservatives in the state’s history. Learn more about YRT or find your nearest chapter.

Sources and Methodology

This post is sourced strictly to Wikipedia and public election records. The specific Wikipedia articles consulted for this analysis are:

All specific percentages, vote totals, county-level results, and biographical details in this post have been cross-referenced against these Wikipedia articles as of publication. Where Wikipedia does not directly document a specific claim, particularly regarding Gen Z-specific exit polling, this post explicitly notes the data gap rather than citing lower-reliability sources. If you believe any fact in this post is inaccurate or out of date, please let us know and we will update the post.

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